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Abstract. Re-representation and restructuring are processes relevant
to creativity research. These are related to “seeing as”, defined as the
ability to represent features as different meaningful objects, and select
and group objects as relevant structures for the problem at hand. Cre-
ative problem-solving, insight and the three types of creativity proposed
by Boden are explored from the perspective of these terms. A set of es-
sential questions to be answered by the cognitive systems discipline from
the perspective of re-representational ability is put forward. Some of the
implications of enabling re-representation and evaluating systems based
on re-representation are then explored.
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1 Introduction
Let’s say you are in an art gallery, looking at an ambiguous modern art piece and
ask a friend what she sees. Her answer might be very different than yours and it
might surprise you. Though you might appreciate her answer as interesting, you
might think of it as highly subjective and of her ability to see different things
than you in art as not the most extraordinary of skills for survival.
However, the same friend might be with you in a circumstance in which you
have just moved in a different place, with little furniture. Her ability to see a
Cup as a potential Flowerpot, a Shoe as a Hammer to put nails in the walls with
and a piece of Dental Floss as a String for attaching paintings to the nails in the
walls might be very useful. Such an experience might make you realize that this
“seeing as” process has some applications to the real world of problem-solving
and it doesn’t come just with the aesthetical pleasure of interpreting art objects,
or delving into other people’s interpretations.
Being able to recognize objects as what they are is important for perception,
problem-solving, general purpose-guided behavior and survival. Being able to
see objects like something else might not seem so straightforwardly useful in the
real world, until connected to the ability to use things in a different way to solve
problems, or see problems in a way which makes them solvable.
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In the following, “seeing as” will be treated as:
(i) the ability to represent a group of features as a meaningful object (even if
those same features have been previously seen as a different object) and
(ii) the ability to represent a group of objects as a meaningful structure which
can help solve the problem at hand (even if those same features have been
previously seen as a different structure).
A connection can be drawn between “seeing as”1 and creativity literature terms
like re-representation, combinatorial and transformational creativity. This paper
will explore the relation between these terms, and describe the interest this
class of processes presents for creative problem-solving, artificial intelligence and
cognitive science.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes creative
problem solving as a productive, flexible process and insight as one of its inter-
esting empirically studied high points which sometimes reflects the “seeing as”
description. Section 3 brings forth the definitions of transformational creativity
and re-representation, as proposed in the literature, and shows their common
ground. Important questions to be asked about re-representation are proposed
in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the importance of re-representation for artificial
intelligence, cognitive science, and the evaluation of creative systems.
2 Creative problem solving, insight and “seeing as”
An old philosophical thought experiment attributed to Berkeley [2] asks: “If a
tree falls in the forest, and there is no one to hear it, does it make a sound?” If
we define sound in cognitive terms (not just as physical vibration, but physical
vibration which needs to reach a hearing sensor), than there is no sound unless
organisms with some form of hearing sensors are around.
Similarly, problems do not exist in the physical world, they are an artefact
of the cognitive processing of an agent. Problems only exist for agents that have
goals or experience a discomfort between their needs and the external environ-
ment.
Thus a part of the classical view on problem-solving which defines problems
as the “distance from the initial state to the goal state” (Thomas Barkowsky,
personal communication) reflects much more than a computational view. It re-
flects the fact that the only agents which encounter “problems” are agents that:
(a) are capable of having goals (not necessarily formulated as such, but as good
conditions to exist in) or of feeling discomforts between their needs and the
current state of affairs, and (b) have the ability to diminish such discomfort by
changing their world (or their state or both).
Furthermore, well-structured problems are rarely encountered in the world
[19], with ill-structured problems being the norm [18]. One can look at creative
1 When mentioning the term “seeing as”, the visual domain (visual sensory input,
visual representation or visual imagination) is not the only one the authors refer to.
“Seeing as” and Re-representation 3
problem-solving as an effort made by the solver to bring productive structure to
ill-structured problems [21], with multiple ways of “structuring” being possible.
Such structuring becomes clear when it is an impediment to solving, like in
the case of functional fixedness [7, 12] - which involves being stuck in one of
the possible interpretations of the problem or of the problem’s objects, with no
ability to see other solutions or representations of the problem.
Thus in our understanding, the process of creative problem-solving contains:
1. the ability of a cognitive, natural or artificial system to use new objects to
solve a problem, other than the ones that have been stored in its memory as
tools for that specific purpose (if any), or to create those objects by putting
together objects or parts of objects the system has access to. Depending
on the problem, objects can be either physical or abstract/informational
(concepts, problem templates, heuristics or other forms of representations).
2. the ability to see the problem in a way which makes it fit for or easy to act
on with existing physical or abstract tools.
Both such abilities involve a capacity for representational change and require
processes which afford fluidity in changing representations of features, objects,
concepts, problems and heuristics. In the following, we will sometimes use the
words representing and interpreting interchangeably. This is to show the fluid
nature of the representation process, which involves interpreting a certain set of
stimuli as a certain previously known concept, object or problem. “Seeing as”
can thus be observed at a variety of levels, from ambiguous figures to insight
problem solving.
2.1 Ambiguous figures
In the simple example of the duck-rabbit illusion, two figures can be seen in an
ambiguous image, as shown in Figure 1 a). Let’s say the sensory input set of an
image x is Sx. Thus, all the elements of the image 1 – the duck-rabbit illusion –
are sensory input set S1. A cognitive agent A viewing the figure might recognize
it as representation r1 – a duck – or representation r2 – a rabbit. Both r1 and
r2 are pre-existing representations in the knowledge base of agent A (KBA).
The same set of features S1 is interpreted or seen as different known repre-
sentations. Groups of the features in S1 can be seen as different or same object
parts. Let’s say that the sensory input S1 is split in 6 feature groups
2, where a
feature group fgx, fgx ∈ S1, is something which can be easily interpreted as a
known concept by agent A:
S1 = {fg1, fg2, fg3, fg4, fg5, fg6}
These feature groups can be translated into concepts for each representation,
as follows:
2 These feature groups might not be the same for the two representations r1 and r2,
as will be seen in the girl-saxophonist illusion in Figure 1 b).
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Fig. 1. Ambiguous figures: a) The duck-rabbit and b) The girl-saxophonist
(i) r1 ⊃ {beak, head, eye, neck, feathers, back of head}; interpretation via r1
– a duck;
(ii) r2 ⊃ {ears, head, eye, neck, fur, pout}; interpretation via r2 – a rabbit.
Some of these concepts might overlap, like head, eye, neck, while others are dis-
parate. The eye might take two different inclinations depending on whether r1
or r2 is being produced as an overall interpretation, with the dichotomy be-
tween beak and ears and the general inclination of the head determining which
figure is being seen. Thus visual groups of features are interpreted as known
representations of animal body parts, with these acting as sub-representations
for the overall representation as a duck or a rabbit. The visual features can be
re-interpreted or re-represented at any time through the other representation
parts and overall representation.
The process of re-representation in this case is a process of mapping from
external stimuli to known representations, as shown in Figure 2. In this process,
the external stimuli are “seen as” a figure or another. It is worth noting that
parsing is a form of interpretation already. This can be seen in Figure 1 b), where
the act of grouping features already makes a difference in what is ultimately seen
in the figure. Thus grouping all the black features of the left side into a figure
enables us to see the saxophonist, while grouping the black elliptical shapes as
eyes enables us to see the girl’s face.
The process of mapping the sensory elements of S1 first or more naturally
to r1 or r2 can depend on a variety of factors, like: (i) which elements of S1 are
interpreted first; (ii) the ease of access in KBA from initial interpreted elements
to r1 or r2; (iii) the strength of r1 or r2 interpretations over keeping together
the sensory elements, etc.
It is worth remembering that neither of the two figures would be available to
us in either of the ambiguous figures examples, if we wouldn’t know about ducks
and rabbits, about girl faces and saxophonists. Antoine de Saint-Exupe´ry said
that “A rock pile ceases to be a rock pile the moment a single man contemplates
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Fig. 2. Mapping sensory input to different representations in the duck-rabbit illusion.
it, bearing within him the image of a cathedral.” [5]. He probably meant to
emphasize the way the motivation and representations held by a human agent
could shape the world. However, conversely, a cathedral is just a rock pile, when
looked at by an agent that doesn’t carry any concept or representation of a
cathedral. The representations that an agent holds constrain the interpretations
that can be bestowed upon a set of external stimuli, as they enable various forms
of grouping and parsing.
Seeing as and re-representation have been shown to play a role in compu-
tational models of creative inference. A creative system for object replacement
and object composition (OROC) has been shown to solve the human Alterna-
tive Uses Test [24] using re-representation strategies in which unavailable known
objects are replaced with other objects that afford the same task. For example,
OROC makes alternative use inferences like the following: “Dental floss may be
used to hang clothes to dry.”. This is done via ignoring the first representation of
the features needed (which comes from knowledge of the initial needed object)
and branching into other possible representations of the needed features. Thus
needed features are re-represented as other possible objects, enabling OROC to
see dental floss as a clothesline.
Thus “seeing as” or re-representation of given features as different objects
(or, in the extended case, seeing groups of objects as different problems) can be
applied as a tool for understanding the process of creative problem-solving at
different levels.
2.2 “Seeing as” in insight problems
The problem-solving literature [16, 7, 1] describes insight as a process in four
steps: Familiarization with the problem, Incubation, Illumination and Verifi-
cation. The insight moment (or the illumination stage) is meant to represent a
6 Ana-Maria Oltet¸eanu
moment in which the problem is seen in a solvable way, with the path to solution
becoming clear. It is still debated in the literature [17, 26, 9] whether this process
proceeds in incremental ways or is the product of a “flash of insight” moment.
However, some agreement exists that the solution in insight problems comes
soon after discovering a suitable representation for the problem, which makes
the solution seem straightforward. Whether this representation is a previously
existing one, or one which needs to be created from existing parts can be used
to differentiate between processes of search and composition in problem-solving
[21].
Two cases of empirical object insight problems can offer an easy example of
how “seeing as” and re-representation play a role in the solving process. In the
candle problem [7], the participants are given a box of thumbtacks, a book of
matches and a candle, as depicted in Fig. 3. The goal is to fix the lit candle unto
a wall in such a way that the wax will not drip onto the table below.
Fig. 3. Depiction of the candle problem
In the two strings problem [16], the participant is put in a room with two
strings hanging from the ceiling, and a variety of other objects scattered around.
A condition of the problem is that the participant cannot touch the second string
while holding the first because of the distance at which they are positioned. The
goal is however to tie the two strings together. These insight problems can be
solved by: a) seeing the thumbtack box in the candle problem (empty and) as
a candle support; b) seeing the string in the string problem as an incomplete
pendulum which can be used to bring the string closer to the second string.
In both of these cases, the participants solving these problems know both
objects - the initial recognized object, and the “seen as” object. Thus partici-
pants know of both thumbtacks boxes (r1) and candle supports (r2) for the first
problem, and of strings (r3) and pendulums (r4) for the second problem. Solving
the problem is a matter of seeing part of the feature set in the first problem (fs1)
as r2, not just r1, and part of the feature set in the second problem (fs2) as r4
rather than r3.
Thus in such problems, the initial feature set can be represented in multi-
ple ways, but not necessarily at the same time. Both r1 and r2 can be valid
interpretations of fs1, in the same way in which both figures can be discerned
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Fig. 4. Depiction of the two strings problem
in the ambiguous figure case. The thumbtack box’s interpretation as r1, and
more generally a container, is made salient by the fact that thumbtacks are
stored in it, and by the way the problem is described. An interpretation of the
same features as r2 - a support for candles, requires accessing knowledge about
other objects that have been previously used as candle support, and a process
of re-representing the same features as that object.
The same process is applied to seeing the string as a pendulum, however the
features which can be represented as a string can only be seen as an incomplete
pendulum. Thus, the creation of a pendulum in the initial set-up of this problem,
which brings in the problem the affordance of setting one of the strings in motion
and not being required to hold on to it, requires also seeing one of the objects
scattered on the floor - the pliers - as the weight which can be attached to the
string to thus construct a pendulum.
Of course, the solutions shown here to these two insight problems have been
anticipated by the designers of this empirical experiment. However, in an open
ended world, with no predesigned solution, creative problem-solving is applied
when the given features of a problem are taken as an ambiguous set, i.e. a set
which can be parsed in various ways and interpreted using various represen-
tations by the agent. It is worth noting that any such interpretation under a
different representation can bring forth different heuristics, implicit knowledge
or ways of solving the problem, which are associated with that particular repre-
sentation, in the same way in which building a pendulum brings into the problem
the affordance of a certain type of motion. Thus re-representation transforms the
way we should look at the problem-solving process in general.
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2.3 The interpretation, representation or “seeing as” step in
(creative) problem-solving
The previous examples show that the problem and its structure depend on the
representations of the solver. Thus classical problem-solving, which defines a
problem as:
- An initial state;
- Operators or successor functions which define reachable states f(x) from any
state x;
- A state space, constituted of all the reachable states based on applying the
operators to initial states in whatever sequence;
- Paths - sequences through the state space;
- Path cost - a function used to evaluate the best heuristics;
- Goal state or goal tests (to determine if the goal state has been reached) and
- Heuristics which can be appraised on their success and optimality,
can be refined as to allow for the initial interpretation or representation of
the problem, and its future potential re-representations, by containing:
- An initial set of features;
- An initial set of representations in the knowledge base of the solver;
- Interpretation steps which act upon the set of features (seeing as), translating
them into representations of what the objects are, what the salient elements
are, what the problem is;
- This yields an initial state, with attached operators and paths (the operators
known or strongly associated by the problem-solver to those representations);
- The next steps are applied as in classical problem-solving. If the process is
not successful: a) restart at the interpretation step (re-represent features,
objects, what the problem is) or b) change currently held representations or
c) bring new features in.
A problem can thus be represented via a set of problem spaces, which can be
created using the representations of the solver, where these representations can
themselves be changed as to accommodate the problem. In the case of successful
creative problem-solving, the representation of the problem as one of these sets
brings forth the solution. Thus one set contains a path to the goal, or can be
adapted such that a path is created.
Considering this, the likelihood of success might increase in the case of: a)
many representations in the knowledge base of the solver; b) an ability to fluidly
translate between these representations as to adaptively use different represen-
tational tools for the problem at hand and c) an ability to modify promising but
incomplete/imperfect/not fully fitting representations as to suit the problem.
Thus, for any set of sensory features and objects which might constitute
the problem, the objects seen and the structure (or problem templates) applied
depend on the knowledge base of the solver (KB), the representations it holds
(R) and its ability to navigate between a representation and another via various
processes (like the ones proposed in [21]).
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Furthermore, as mentioned before, “seeing as” pertains to the ability to in-
corporate a set of features received via sensory input in a known object, concept
or representation. This can be done equally well in other domains than the
visual - one can hear a particular musical theme in pianissimo with a particu-
lar pitch contour as a caress; one can hear another string of notes as someone
approaching. Multimodal re-representations are thus possible as well. Finally, re-
representations don’t pertain to objects alone, but can apply to entire situations,
groups of objects and actions, and entire mental models.
It will be an interesting challenge for artificial intelligence to enable systems
with the capacity of changing the way they represent things, and the ability
to see objects, concepts and problems (or parts thereof) as different possible
objects, concepts and problems3.
3 Re-representation and Boden’s types of creativity
Restructuring has been proposed in theories of insightful problem solving as the
process of changing the initial problem representation, as to find a productive
representation which makes the solution (or solution path) obvious [4, 7, 13, 20].
Thus according to Batchelder and Alexander [1], in insight problems: Likely
initial representations are inadequate in that they fail to allow the possibility
of discovering a problem solution.[...] In order to overcome such a failure, it is
necessary to find an alternative productive representation of the problem. Here
we consider restructuring and re-representation as similar processes.
Boden [3] describes creativity as “the ability to come up with ideas and
artefacts that are new, surprising and valuable”. Boden proposes three styles
of creativity: combinatorial, exploratory and transformational. The combinato-
rial style, in her words, “involves making unfamiliar combinations of familiar
ideas. [...] Think of a physicist comparing an atom to the solar system [...]”
Exploratory creativity is related to conceptual spaces as “structured styles of
thought”. Thus, “Within a given conceptual space, many thoughts are possible,
only some of which may actually have been thought.[...] someone who comes up
with a new idea within that thinking style is being creative in the second, ex-
ploratory sense.”. Boden defines transformational creativity as “someone think-
ing something which, with respect to the conceptual spaces in their minds, they
couldn’t have thought before. [...] (the preexisting style) must be tweaked, or
even radically transformed, so that thoughts are now possible which previously
(within the untransformed space) were literally inconceivable”.
In order to allow for a comparison between Boden’s creativity styles and
re-representation, all three styles will be taken into account. Thus let’s say
“structured styles of thought” are the norm, and these are the equivalent of
the representations one has and is used to navigating in a particular manner
when thinking. One might of course come up with a new idea which one has
not yet thought of and is surprising. However, when a moment of combinatorial
3 This relates to the human capacity for interpretation and to artefact interpretability,
which will be further discussed in Section 5.
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creativity arrives - if a physicist compares an atom to the solar system - this is a
case of “seeing as” - and therefore a possibility of re-representation. What might
not be so obvious is that a) some processes have already allowed this seeing as
(like structure mapping, or noticing similarities); those microprocesses are rep-
resentative for creativity and b) such “combinatorial creativity” moment might
very well be what enables further “transformational creativity”.
Thus, exploring further this re-representation of an atom as the solar system,
one can transform the conceptual space of what an atom is. Initial representa-
tions and ways of thinking about those representations are transformed in the
same way by exploring how the structure of the benzene molecule can be seen as
an Ouroboros snake or a tibetan knot, or how one could apply form principles
from preclassicism in atonal music.
Seeing the world as made of rabbits when the other people see it as made
of ducks can shape the way one proceeds when dealing with the world. Thus
engaging in exploratory creativity from a different set of representations might
indeed transform the conceptual space, especially if the rabbit representation
proves more productive (better traps are used for whatever the actual animal
that is hunted is, more things can be understood and confirmed in practice with
the new mental model of the atom, etc.).
The transition from one representation (of the same object, set of objects)
to another allows for transformation and further exploration. Thus, in this view,
re-representation is a key process in transformational creativity, be it that such
re-representation happened overtly or covertly.
4 Questions to be asked
Various questions are of productive interest for the computational study of cre-
ative problem-solving. This section proposes the following:
Q1 - How can representation be changed in a cognitive system?
Representation is questioned as a concept in cognitive science, in terms of types
and existence. This type of inquiry studies what the neuro-cognitive reality of
representation is aside from the phenomenology of it (with some authors even
debating there is one).
From the general perspective of creativity, a more important question is that
of how relations between representations are formed, how representations of
formerly singular entities can be blended [8], how structures of various repre-
sentations can be mapped in analogy [10] and metaphor [14, 15], or combined,
searched and made to converge [21].
At the level of insight, re-representation and transformational creativity, the
question of interest refers to the way a cognitive system could operate with: a)
a set of sensory inputs and/or b) previous existing stored memories, in order to
see them as forming different objects and different sets of problems with affer-
ent heuristics. To further study this transition between possible interpretations
requires enabling systems with fluidity in structuring and re-structuring repre-
sentations of stimuli, and representations of previous representations (and also
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understanding the way this happens in natural systems). In the case of creative
cognitive systems, representations are not to be regarded as fixed and unique,
but rather as changing entities which adapt to the needs of the problem at hand,
recruiting material from other existing stimuli or from previous knowledge.
Q2 - What kind of memory could efficiently support processes of
productive thought and alternate representation in cognitive systems?
The question of changing representations has direct implications on the way
artificial cognitive systems should be planned, the design of their knowledge
representation structures (and processes, as adressed in the next question). Fluid
representations might require a precision trade-off on the storing information
(memory) side.
This is encountered in human memory in various ways (e.g. in constructive
memory, shape bias). Data structures capable of such features need to be enabled
in order to efficiently allow representation change. Such memory/data structure
design might be the first step in creating efficient processes which are able to
transgress domain boundaries and gather different knowledge, thus lifting the
burden of functional fixedness and enabling new productive solutions.
Q3 - What kind of processes can deal on a large scale with such a
memory search, as to put together very disparate information ?
Mechanisms for analogy [10, 11] and metaphor [14, 15] have been proposed.
Mechanisms for associative, similarity and structure-based search and replace-
ment [21] have also been proposed. More empirical evidence needs to be gathered
on (i) what such mechanisms are in natural cognitive systems and (ii) what are
their different classes. More experimental settings which can investigate these
processes and compare them need to be designed. From the AI perspective,
various comparable mechanisms can be implemented, and help the testing of
cognitive hypotheses.
Attempting to answer these questions in computational and empirical ways
can yield future important lines of investigation, including: complexity in cre-
ative problem-solving, what impairs re-representation on a wider scale in hu-
mans, the relationship between representation and process in problem-solving,
the relevance or irrelevance of phenomenological “aha” effects in insight, how
associative and remote search processes are controlled, etc.
5 Discussion
Re-representation and “seeing as”, with their relation to combinatorial and
transformational creativity as defined by Boden, are important for both arti-
ficial intelligence and cognitive science, because of the foundational questions
they pose. Thus, questions Q1, Q2 and Q3 are fundamental questions about the
nature of representations, representation organization and processes. For artifi-
cial intelligence, they refer to the representations, data structures and algorithms
we need to enable to obtain creative, creative-like or creativity assistive systems.
For cognitive science, they bring us back to fundamental question of represen-
12 Ana-Maria Oltet¸eanu
tation, process and their interdependence, allowing us to study them in a new
context.
Creative computational systems are assessed in a variety of ways [3, 25, 27],
be it from the perspective of process, from that of novelty, through human judges
or by comparability with human responses in similar creativity tasks [23, 24].
However, in the light of the previous sections, perhaps a metric should be es-
tablished which related such creative systems to “seeing as” and re-representation.
In this vein, two possibilities are proposed here:
(a) a metric which measures the ability of a system to re-represent features as
objects, concepts, sets of objects, scenes, problem templates;
(b) a metric which measures the possibilities of the work created by such systems
to be re-represented.
Point (a) is self-explanatory after the previous reading, however a methodol-
ogy would need to be put in place. Point (b) refers to supporting (natural and ar-
tificial) critics of creativity to assess creative systems, based on the breadth of in-
terpretation their products have. All the ways in which such an artefact/product
could be seen might be hard to map. However, a work which can be seen in mul-
tiple ways might offer the possibility of multiple interpretation4, in the same way
in which an object offering similar re-representation possibilities might generate
multiple uses.
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